The CW’s Next Act Could Be Its Strangest Yet
For most of its life, The CW has been TV’s great Frankenstein experiment: a broadcast network stitched together from the remnants of UPN and The WB, built not on the muscle of a national O&O footprint but on the goodwill of independent affiliates and long-tail studio pipelines.
It has always been an oddball in a landscape dominated by the four major networks. But if two looming media deals close — Paramount-Skydance’s hostile bid for Warner Bros. Discovery, and Nexstar’s proposed, rules-stretching acquisition of TEGNA — that quirky origin story becomes something far more problematic. The CW would morph into a structurally conflicted junior network living inside a vertically integrated Nexstar empire, while a newly combined Paramount-WBD sits in the boardroom with its own Big Four network to protect.
The result is a network that risks being treated less like a national broadcaster and more like a bargaining chip.
A Network Born As A Patchwork
When CBS Corp. and Warner Bros. merged UPN and The WB in 2006, they created a 50/50 joint venture built entirely on outsourcing: rely on outside station groups for distribution, lean on studio pipelines for youth-focused dramas, and keep corporate control light and centralized. The CW was intentionally modular — a fifth network that didn’t need to operate like one.
Nexstar’s 2022 acquisition of a 75% stake blew up that model. Suddenly a pure-play station group — not a major studio — controlled The CW’s programming strategy, ad sales, and affiliate relations. Paramount and Warner Bros. Discovery each retained a 12.5% share, mostly to maintain a seat at the table and keep a path open for scripted series. The structure was unusual then; today, with even more dealmaking in motion, it’s starting to look borderline untenable.
What A Paramount–WBD Merger Would Mean For The CW’s Governance
If Paramount succeeds in its bid for WBD, the two minority stakes in The CW would consolidate into a single 25% shareholder — one that also owns the CBS broadcast network, CBS Studios, and 29 TV stations, including 15 CBS O&Os. That would create one of the strangest ownership arrangements U.S. broadcasting has ever seen: the owner of a Big Four network simultaneously holding a quarter of a smaller rival it has every incentive to sideline.
Contractual guardrails won’t change the underlying math. A merged Paramount–WBD would naturally steer its most valuable IP, top-tier scripted series, and marquee sports rights toward CBS and its streaming platforms (Paramount+ and HBO Max). Using The CW as anything more than a secondary outlet would be irrational, even as the company sits in its boardroom with nominal strategic influence. The setup practically invites content foreclosure, slow-rolled premium supply, and persistent creative friction with Nexstar — all while allowing Paramount–WBD to claim it is fulfilling its governance duties.
None of this is hypothetical. Nexstar has already pushed The CW toward lower-cost unscripted fare and imported sports to stem years of losses. With Paramount–WBD now at the table, the network’s access to meaningful, studio-grade originals shrinks even further. The CW becomes a corporate rounding error: too small to invest in, yet too strategically useful to abandon.
Meanwhile: Nexstar Builds a Vertically Integrated CW Stack
Now layer in the second major transaction: Nexstar’s proposed $6.2 billion acquisition of Tegna, which would add 64 stations to a portfolio that already exceeds 200 outlets. Upon closing — assuming minimal divestitures — the combined company would control roughly 265 stations across 44 states + D.C., covering around 80% of U.S. television households. That scale would make Nexstar the closest thing the U.S. has seen to a vertically integrated broadcast conglomerate outside the traditional Big Four.
In many DMAs (depending on final FCC-required divestitures), Nexstar could end up owning The CW O&O, one or more Big Four network affiliates, and additional independent stations — all while overseeing programming for The CW nationally.
Even if the formal duopoly/divestiture rules remain in place, the market-level bargaining leverage would likely still be enormous. Nexstar could negotiate retransmission-consent deals across entire clusters of “must-have” stations, bundle local‑sports rights under its umbrella, and reallocate programming or resources among its stations with considerable flexibility.
For The CW, this would mean its distribution backbone becomes even more dominated by Nexstar-controlled O&Os — the very stations whose economics Nexstar will prioritize. For independent affiliates (especially those owned by groups like Gray Television or Sinclair Broadcast Group), the future would likely hold tighter reverse-compensation demands, increased risk of losing marquee sports windows to Nexstar O&Os, and a higher risk of non-renewal once affiliation contracts expire.
In short: the gatekeeper and competitor risks becoming one and the same — or, at minimum, overlapping far more than past consolidation waves have allowed.
The Combined Deals Create Conflicts The Industry Has Never Seen
The CW’s founding architects never imagined a scenario in which:
One company (Paramount–WBD) owns both CBS and 25% of The CW;
Another company (Nexstar) controls the network’s majority stake and many of its largest affiliates; AND
Those two companies simultaneously act as competitors, partners, and program suppliers.
This triangle of misaligned incentives creates three pressure points that regulators cannot ignore:
Cross-network ownership distorts competition. Paramount–WBD would have every incentive to treat The CW as a low-priority feeder system — offloading library-grade content while protecting CBS’s brand and streaming platforms. The concept of The CW as a “fifth network alternative” effectively collapses.
Local market power becomes dangerously concentrated. A combined Nexstar–TEGNA would give one company enormous leverage over pay-TV operators, advertisers, and sports leagues in major U.S. markets. That concentration would affect not just The CW, but the broader local broadcast ecosystem.
Content discrimination becomes structural, not accidental. The Paramount–WBD/Nexstar governance model is practically designed for program-supply conflicts: one side seeks to reserve high-value series for CBS, while the other must program a national network on a tight budget. Viewers and affiliates end up paying the price.
The CW’s Next Chapter Depends On Regulators — And Honest Assessment
The CW was once a creative hybrid. Under the weight of these deals, it risks becoming something entirely different: a network whose primary purpose is to serve the strategic and financial interests of its parent companies — not the needs of viewers, creators, or the local affiliates that still give it national reach.
Regulators reviewing these transactions should be explicit: The CW’s future must factor into the public-interest calculus. Without structural safeguards — or, in some markets, forced divestitures — the network could become little more than a pawn in a consolidation chess match.
Long a marginal player in the broadcast ecosystem, The CW now faces the risk of irrelevance — or worse, of being turned into a tool of leverage rather than a service to audiences. If this is the next chapter, the FCC has every reason to demand a rewrite.
Local News To Peruse
The CW Will Turn A Profit “At Some Point” In 2026, Parent Company Nexstar’s CFO Says - Dade Hayes [Deadline]
Why Consolidation In Local TV Is Bad For Consumers And Local News — And About To Get Much Worse - [Kressin Powers]
The Networks’ Robbery Of Affiliates Might Finally End - Hank Price [TVNewsCheck]
After NPR And PBS Defunding, FCC Receives Call To Take Away Station Licenses - Jon Brodkin [Ars Technica]
Weigel’s MeTV Is One Of The Top TV Networks In America. Most Of Its Shows Are Decades Old. - Matthew Keys [TheDesk.net]
2026 Local TV Ad Forecasts Offer Growth and Uncertainties - George Winslow [TVTech]
